International Relations (IR) has long grappled with the question of whether it can truly be considered a science. Since its inception after World War I, driven by a desire to understand war and peace, the discipline has evolved significantly in its understanding of what a "scientific" approach entails. This article explores the concept of International Relations as Science, delving into the foundational philosophies that shape how scholars study global politics.

Understanding International Relations as Science: A Philosophical Lens

To understand International Relations as science, we must first grasp the concept of the philosophy of science. This field, emerging prominently in the early 20th century, examines the very nature and practice of science itself. It seeks to distinguish scientific explanations from other forms of knowledge like speculation or intuition.

At its core, any philosophy of science rests on three types of fundamental assumptions, often referred to as "meta-theory":

Ontological Assumptions: These are claims about existence and being—what is there to know? What constitutes reality?
Epistemological Assumptions: These address what constitutes valid knowledge and the grounds for such claims—how can we know what exists?
Methodological Assumptions: These define the practice of science and the specific methods used to gain knowledge—how do we gain knowledge?

These assumptions are not subject to proof as true or false; they are foundational starting points, akin to axioms in logic. This inherent nature means that diverse philosophies of science exist, each offering a distinct understanding of what science is and how it should be conducted. For IR, this means different approaches to studying global phenomena.

The Evolution of Scientific Inquiry in IR

Initially, International Relations was seen as a field that synthesized knowledge from various disciplines like law, economics, and history. However, by the late 1930s, a growing consensus emerged: for IR to be a "science," it needed to adopt the methods of the natural sciences. This involved collecting facts, arranging them systematically, and explaining them, leading figures like E.H. Carr to advocate for realism's scientific potential due to its focus on facts and causation.

This shift marked a departure from the earlier "traditional" or "classical" inquiry, which did not necessarily draw its understanding of science from the natural sciences. Since the 1950s, a particular understanding of science, positivism, has come to dominate and shape the discipline, influencing many of the most influential IR theories.

What is Positivism in International Relations?

Positivism, as a philosophy of science, posits that authentic knowledge is based solely on empirical experience obtained through the senses. It claims that knowledge can and must be reduced to the interpretation of "positive results"—evidence confirming hypotheses derived from theories.

Originating with Auguste Comte in the 19th century, positivism champions a methodological unity of science, suggesting that all sciences, including social sciences, should adhere to the observation and experiment methods of the natural sciences. For IR, this means seeking to establish law-like regularities and causal relationships in international politics.

Key Philosophical Assumptions of Positivism

Positivism is an integrated philosophical complex, with its ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions interlocking. Here's a breakdown:

Epistemological Core: Empiricism and Phenomenalism
Empiricism: Knowledge primarily derives from sensory observation and experience. Only statements about observable phenomena count as knowledge, meaning hypotheses and theories must be empirically testable.
Phenomenalism: Reality is perceived through senses as "perceptual phenomena" rather than "things in themselves." Scientific theories thus refer to these phenomena, not an ultimate, objective reality. This leads to positivism being labeled "anti-realist" in this specific context.
Objectivism: Despite phenomenalism, positivism believes objective knowledge is possible. This knowledge is derived from verified empirical experience, where observations are intersubjectively provable through repeatable experiments. Scientific knowledge is considered provisional, subject to falsification.
Ontological Core: Materialism and Atomism
Materialism/Physicalism/Ontological Naturalism: Reality ultimately consists of "matter" and is governed by natural laws. Everything, including the human mind, is ultimately material.
Atomism/Particularism/Individualism: The world is composed of the smallest, indivisible material particles or elementary units. In social science, this means society is understood as aggregates of individuals, whose actions are the basic units of analysis.
Nominalism: Denies the existence of "universals" (abstract concepts like "the state" or "humankind") as real entities. These are seen as mere mental constructs or analytical instruments, existing only through their observable particulars. For instance, "Foreign Policy" only exists when referenced by a particular policy at a specific time.
Methodological Implications: Operationalism, Reductionism, and Unity of Science
Operationalism and Instrumentalism: Theoretical terms must be "translated" or "operationalized" into observable, measurable variables. Concepts are viewed as analytical instruments to organize observations, rather than as existing entities.
Methodological Individualism: Social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from the actions and interactions of individuals. Macro-phenomena are explained by micro-foundations, prioritizing an action-centered view (e.g., rational choice theory).
Reductionism: Systems or things can be reduced to and explained by their individual elements. This principle, akin to Ockham's razor (preferring the simplest explanation), suggests that to understand the "whole," one must study its parts.
Unity of Science: The ideal that all phenomena can ultimately be explained by a fundamental, elementary science, typically classical physics. This grants a privileged position to natural science methodologies, arguing a single scientific method can analyze both the natural and social worlds.

Causal, Law-like Explanation and Prediction

Positivism assumes the world is governed by laws, leading to a focus on causal, law-like explanations. This involves establishing cause-and-effect relationships between entities, where a cause (independent variable) temporally precedes an effect (dependent variable).

Correlation vs. Causation: While correlation (two variables appearing together) is important, positivist science aims for deeper causal analysis, seeking a single cause for each phenomenon.
Law-like Explanations: When a hypothesized interrelationship between cause and effect is scientifically verified, it counts as valid, law-like knowledge. Examples include the deductive-nomological model (deducing particular events from general laws) and the inductive-statistical model (inferring general laws from specific events).
Belief in Prediction: Based on its causal framework, positivist science holds a fundamental belief in the possibility of prediction: if A, then B.

Competing Philosophies and Ongoing Debates

While positivism has profoundly shaped IR, there have always been significant debates. The "Great Debates" of the 1960s, notably between "traditionalists" (like Hedley Bull) and "scientists" (like Morton Kaplan), highlighted differing understandings of appropriate methods. Traditionalists criticized positivism for neglecting crucial aspects of international politics due to its strict empirical view.

More recently, since the 1990s, the positivism-postpositivism debate has brought to the forefront a wider range of understandings of science within IR. Labels like "post-positivism" are umbrella terms for critiques drawing on philosophies such as constructivism, realism (scientific and critical), pragmatism, and historicism. These alternative approaches do not necessarily reject systematic inquiry but offer different ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions for studying international politics. They emphasize that the very idea of science as a system of knowledge remains a core area of debate, ensuring the discipline continues its philosophical evolution.

Frequently Asked Questions about International Relations as Science

What are the main assumptions of the philosophy of science?

The philosophy of science is built upon ontological (what exists), epistemological (what constitutes valid knowledge), and methodological (how knowledge is gained) assumptions. These assumptions are foundational starting points that are not subject to being proven true or false.

How did International Relations become a science?

IR began as a systematic study of war and peace after WWI. Over time, particularly from the late 1930s onwards, it increasingly adopted methodologies inspired by the natural sciences, focusing on collecting facts, ordering them, and providing explanations, leading to the dominance of positivism from the 1950s.

What is positivism in the context of International Relations?

Positivism is a dominant philosophy of science in IR that asserts authentic knowledge is derived from empirical experience and observation. It emphasizes the scientific method, the search for causal relationships, law-like explanations, and the possibility of prediction in international politics, often viewing theoretical terms as analytical instruments for observables.

What is the difference between methodological individualism and holism?

Methodological individualism, prevalent in positivism, explains phenomena by reducing them to the actions and interactions of individual parts or actors. Methodological holism (or structuralism), in contrast, explains phenomena in terms of social wholes or structures, arguing that the system's properties cannot be reduced to its component parts alone.

International Relations as Science