Empowerment of the European Parliament

The Empowerment of the European Parliament represents a fascinating journey from a largely consultative assembly to a powerful co-legislator in the European Union's political system. Initially perceived as a mere "talking shop," the European Parliament (EP) has undergone a spectacular transformation, incrementally acquiring substantial powers through strategic activism and successive treaty reforms. This detailed analysis explores the key milestones and mechanisms that led to its current prominent role.

Understanding the Gradual Empowerment of the European Parliament

For much of its early history, the EP was considered a "powerless institution." However, its evolution is a testament to what has been termed "institutional patriotism" – the Parliament's proactive efforts to expand its influence. This involved leveraging opportunities, utilizing its Rules of Procedure to set precedents, and asserting its democratic foundations to legitimize its increasing powers.

Origins: From Assembly to Direct Elections

The EP began its life as the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1951 and commencing work in 1952. This initial step, proposed by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, aimed to foster European integration by pooling control over vital industries like coal and steel to prevent future conflicts.

Key early developments include:

• 1951: Establishment of the Assembly by the Treaty of Paris.
• 1952: First meeting of the ECSC Parliamentary Assembly.
• 1957: Treaty of Rome expanded the Assembly's scope to include the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
• 1962: The Assembly officially adopted the name "European Parliament."

Early on, the Assembly had limited powers, primarily the ability to force the High Authority (now the European Commission) to resign through a motion of censure. Despite this, it began to extend its prerogatives informally, notably through newly created policy-specialized committees.

Budgetary Powers and Direct Elections: A Turning Point

The late 1960s and 1970s marked a period of significant institutional change for the EP, despite overall "Eurosclerosis" caused by economic crises.

• 1970/1975: The Treaty of Luxembourg granted the EP budgetary power over non-compulsory expenditures, allowing it to have a final say on a portion of the budget. This limited power was strategically used to expand its influence.
• 1979: The first direct elections for the European Parliament were held, a crucial turning point. This gave the EP a new democratic legitimacy, being the only directly elected EU institution.

This newfound legitimacy was recognized by the European Court of Justice in its 1980 Isoglucose Ruling, which underscored the EP's authority in the consultation procedure and empowered MEPs to use their existing powers more aggressively.

Major Treaty Reforms and Enhanced Legislative Influence

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed accelerated Empowerment of the European Parliament through a series of foundational treaty reforms.

The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986

The SEA introduced significant changes:

• Cooperation Procedure: This new legislative procedure allowed the EP to propose amendments to Commission proposals, marking an important step towards co-decision, although it didn't grant full veto powers.
• Official Name: The name "European Parliament" was officially adopted.
• Assent Procedure: The EP gained the right to veto the accession of new member states and the ratification of association agreements.

The SEA also signaled the gradual demise of the Luxembourg Compromise, leading to more Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council, which some argued necessitated greater parliamentary legitimacy at the European level.

The Treaty of Maastricht of 1992

Maastricht was a pivotal moment, significantly strengthening the EP's legislative and supervisory powers:

• Co-decision Procedure: Introduced the first version of co-decision, granting the EP the power to reject legislative proposals and establish a conciliation committee, effectively providing near-veto power over large parts of Community legislation.
• Commission Oversight: The EP gained a vote on the European Council's nomination for Commission President and could cast a vote of confidence on the entire Commission. The Commission's term was also aligned with EP elections.

Maastricht also formalized the European Union's move beyond purely economic matters into political areas, establishing a three-pillar structure (EC policies, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Affairs). While co-decision applied to the first pillar, the EP had limited say in the intergovernmental second and third pillars.

The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997

Amsterdam confirmed the EP's status as a "full co-legislator" by formalizing many informal practices it had developed:

• Co-decision Enhancement: The procedure was modified to reflect informal institutional practices, eliminating the Council's ability to reintroduce its common position if conciliation failed and allowing for early agreement at the first reading stage.
• Commission President Approval: Formalized the EP's right to approve the Commission President candidate and gave it a role in appointing Commissioners.

Despite these advances, the EP did not secure all its desired powers, such as deciding its own seat location or gaining full access to the European Court of Justice in all matters, and remained excluded from CFSP and JHA pillars.

The Treaty of Nice of 2001 and the Road to Lisbon

The Treaty of Nice was largely seen as a disappointment for the EP, as many of its requests were not met.

• Privileged Litigant Status: The EP did gain the ability to challenge other institutions before the European Court of Justice.
• Limited Co-decision Expansion: Co-decision was extended only to uncontentious matters, notably excluding key areas like agriculture.

However, the perceived shortcomings of Nice, particularly regarding enlargement challenges, spurred a "Declaration on the Future of Europe" and led to the innovative idea of a European Convention to draft a Constitutional Treaty. The EP actively participated in this Convention, influencing the draft with its "fingerprints," such as advocating for the term "constitution" and ending the pillar structure.

The Lisbon Treaty and the EP as an Ordinary Legislature

Despite the failure of the Constitutional Treaty's ratification, its core elements heavily influenced the subsequent Treaty of Lisbon.

• 2007 (signed), 2009 (in force): The Treaty of Lisbon significantly transformed the EP's role.
• Ordinary Legislative Procedure: Co-decision was renamed the "ordinary legislative procedure," placing the EP on an equal footing with the Council for most EU legislation.
• Budgetary Parity: The EP gained equal power with member states in allocating the annual budget for all expenditures.
• International Agreements: It received the power to give consent over most international agreements.
• Commission President Election: Formally, the EP now elects the Commission President by a majority of its members, taking into account the results of the EP elections. This led to the "Spitzenkandidaten" (top candidates) process in 2014, making Jean-Claude Juncker the first Commission President nominated by the political group with the highest electoral support.

The post-Lisbon era has seen intensified dialogue between EU institutions, an exponential rise in informal "trilogues" (meetings between the EP, Council, and Commission), and the EP becoming a major space for debating and legitimizing EU policies, even in areas like the Euro crisis management where solutions were often intergovernmental.

Key Figures in the Empowerment of the European Parliament

While the empowerment of the EP is a collective effort driven by institutional dynamics, specific individuals played crucial roles:

• Robert Schuman: French Foreign Minister who proposed the ECSC, initiating the path towards European integration and the Assembly.
• Jean Monnet: Architect of the French Modernisation Plan, whose ideas contributed to the creation of independent supranational institutions.
• Altiero Spinelli: Led the "Crocodile Club" of MEPs, advocating for a "European Union" and maximalist proposals for EP legislative power in the 1980s. His draft treaty influenced the Maastricht reforms.
• Sir Christopher Prout: British Conservative MEP who skillfully rewrote the Rules of Procedure after the SEA to magnify Parliament's powers.
• Elisabeth Guigou and Elmar Brok: MEPs in the "Reflection Group" preparing the 1996 IGC, advocating for increased co-decision and EP involvement.
• Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos and Jo Leinen: Drafted the EP's resolution for the Treaty of Nice, pushing for more democracy and efficiency.
• Klaus Hänsch and Íñigo Méndez de Vigo: EP representatives in the Praesidium of the Constitutional Convention, instrumental in shaping the draft treaty.
• Andrew Duff: Liberal British MEP who produced a draft for a constitution and advocated for saving the Constitution after its initial failure.
• Jean-Claude Juncker: First Commission President nominated through the "Spitzenkandidaten" process, a direct result of the EP's expanded influence post-Lisbon.

These figures, alongside countless other MEPs and diplomats, contributed to the relentless pursuit of greater parliamentary powers.

The EP's Rules of Procedure: An Unsung Hero in its Empowerment

The EP's Rules of Procedure (RoP) have been a critical, albeit often overlooked, tool in its empowerment. Article 25 of the Treaty of Paris (1951) granted the Assembly the power to fix its own rules, a provision that had profound consequences.

• Formalizing Informal Norms: The RoP allowed the EP to codify informal practices into standing rules, shaping its internal organization and inter-institutional balance of power.
• "Stretching" the Treaties: The EP strategically used its RoP to interpret and extend treaty provisions, sometimes placing new obligations on other EU institutions.
• Examples: After Maastricht, Rule 78 was introduced, requiring MEPs to reject the Council's text if an agreement failed, effectively granting veto power, which was later formally incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam.

This continuous adaptation and leveraging of its internal rules have been fundamental to the EP's institutional development, allowing it to push the boundaries of its formal powers.

Conclusion: From Talking Shop to Co-Legislator

The Empowerment of the European Parliament is a story of continuous struggle, strategic opportunism, and a deep-seated belief in representative democracy. From its humble beginnings as the ECSC Assembly, the EP has grown into a mature parliamentary body with full legislative powers, standing on par with national parliaments in many respects.

Its activism, combined with the willingness of member states to formalize these changes through successive treaty reforms, has transformed the EP into a powerful motor of European integration. While still a contested institution, and facing new challenges from Euroscepticism and the rise of the European Council, the EP remains a central pillar of the EU's political system, crucial for democratic accountability and legitimacy.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) about European Parliament Empowerment

What are the main stages of the European Parliament's empowerment?

The empowerment of the European Parliament can be broadly divided into several stages: its establishment as the ECSC Assembly, the gaining of limited budgetary powers and direct elections in the 1970s, significant legislative advancements through the Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty in the 1980s/90s, and finally, its status as a full co-legislator with the Treaty of Lisbon.

How did the European Parliament gain legislative power?

The EP gained legislative power gradually. Initially, it had only a consultative role. The Single European Act (1986) introduced the cooperation procedure, giving it the right to amend proposals. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced co-decision, granting it near-veto power. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) made co-decision the "ordinary legislative procedure," placing the EP on equal footing with the Council in most areas.

What is the role of the Rules of Procedure in the EP's empowerment?

The European Parliament's Rules of Procedure (RoP) have been crucial. They allowed the EP to formalize informal practices, interpret and "stretch" treaty provisions beyond their explicit wording, and introduce new obligations for other EU institutions. This internal rule-making capacity provided a vital tool for the EP to assert and expand its powers over time.

What is the "Spitzenkandidaten" process and how does it relate to the EP?

The "Spitzenkandidaten" (German for "lead candidates") process is an informal mechanism initiated by the EP in 2014. Following the Treaty of Lisbon's provision that the European Council should consider the results of EP elections when nominating the Commission President, political groups put forward their lead candidates. The EP then elected Jean-Claude Juncker, the Spitzenkandidat of the largest political group, strengthening the link between EU voters and the Commission Presidency. This is a key aspect of the Empowerment of the European Parliament in selecting the EU's executive leader.